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It is widely believed that corporate boards are overly reluctant to ￿re their CEOs.
The conventional explanation for retaining a CEO regardless of his/her talent is that
a CEO chooses the board members and has the power to ￿re them. However, very few
studies have investigated how a new CEO is chosen. This paper explores an unexamined
cause of board reluctance in removing a CEO: the incentive to minimize the leakage
from the decision-makers￿future surplus. I argue that this same logic provides the
theoretical explanation for how a new CEO is chosen for both voluntary and forced
CEO replacements. I show that this incentive of the incumbent board and CEO often
departs from the shareholders￿interest. In short, if the net surplus of the incumbent
board and CEO is expected to be larger under an incumbent sub-standard CEO, or
under an internal candidate rather than an external candidate, then they retain the
incumbent sub-standard CEO or promote an internal CEO candidate, even though the
expected corporate pro￿t generated by appointing an external candidate is likely to
have been greater.
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11 Introduction
A ￿rm￿ s board of directors is responsible for monitoring management on behalf of the share-
holders. A Chief Executive O¢ cer (CEO) is assigned to perform in a way to maximize the
corporate pro￿t to meet the shareholders￿expectations. However, a CEO￿ s performance does
not always meet the shareholders￿expectations. In such a case, the job of the board is to
replace the sub-standard CEO with a new CEO who is more talented and thereby enhancing
the corporate pro￿t. However, it is widely believed that corporate boards are inert because
they are slow to remove ine⁄ective CEOs. Of parallel importance, the board as well as an
incumbent CEO is responsible in choosing a new CEO in the case of voluntary CEO replace-
ment. That is, the shareholders expect the board to hire a new CEO from inside or outside
the current board based on the talent of a candidate. Despite this expectation, CEO is often
an internally promoted candidate, and this may be a case of nepotism, for example, s/he
could be a CEO￿ s o⁄spring.
This paper attempts to provide a theoretical rationale for the actions on the part of
the board of directors that depart from shareholders￿interests. The starting point for this
research is to investigate whether there is an advantage for the incumbent board members
themselves to be gained by retaining an existing sub-standard CEO or promoting an inter-
nal CEO candidate, even though the expected corporate pro￿t generated by appointing an
external candidate is likely to have been greater. In other words, in order to understand the
deliberate reason that leads the board to take these actions, I extend the model developed
by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) (whose model is discussed in section two of this paper) to
focus on negotiations held by the incumbent board and CEO in an insular board room.
The conventional explanations for board reluctance in removing a sub-standard CEO
tend to locate the reasons for these actions as a means of securing the board￿ s interests/jobs:
the CEO picks the board members and hence it is costly for the board whose members are
less independent of the CEO to ￿re the incumbent CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998); the
directors fear being ousted from the board when they do not succeed in replacing the CEO
and hence they do not always take initiatives in removing the CEO (Warther 1998); CEOs
2take deliberate actions to create speci￿c human capital that makes it costly to replace them
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989); and the board has dual roles to monitor and advise the CEO,
and the e⁄ectiveness of its monitoring depends on the information environment of outside
directors (Raheja 2005, Adams and Ferreira 2007, and Harris and Raviv 2008). Very few
studies have attempted to develop a theoretical model of how a new CEO is chosen. (Raheja
2005 is discussed in section two of this paper.) I am going to show that the incentive to
minimize the leakage from the decision-makers￿future surplus contributes to the reluctance
of the board for the removal of an incumbent CEO and the choice regarding the appointment
of a new CEO.
This is analyzed in the framework using Nash bargaining game between the two players:
the incumbent CEO and the board of directors.1 The board of directors is treated as a
single player, and hence, there is no free-rider problem. The pro￿t of the ￿rm is dependent
on the CEO￿ s talent. The players sign a contract determined by Nash bargaining. They
bargain over three topics to be written on the contract: the wage of the incumbent CEO,
the amount of money the board is willing to pay to the specialist(s) who monitor(s) the
incumbent CEO￿ s conduct, and the succession policy of whether to hire the next CEO from
inside the board or outside the board. The term monitoring is used to mean learning about
the CEO￿ s talent (which is equally not known to the board and CEO) by reviewing his/her
conduct.2 Monitoring level can be interpreted in several ways.3 In this paper, I interpret
it as the probability of the board obtaining a precise information about the CEO￿ s talent
1In this paper, the incumbent board does not bargain with potential CEOs (newcomers to the management
group), as in Aghion and Bolton (1987), but instead, it bargains only with the incumbent CEO for simplicity.
This is because the same logic is obtained with the case in which the model is built in a way to allow the
incumbent board to choose whether to negotiate or not with potential CEOs. That is, the board will choose
to negotiate with a potential CEO if the board expects the amount of additional pro￿t brought to the board
exceeds the amount of leakage to a potential CEO, but the board decides not to negotiate with a potential
CEO if the opposite holds. Thus, the board decision is based on maximizing its own surplus by minimizing
the amount of leakage.
2Similar to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), the CEO in this paper does not make e⁄orts, and monitoring
is done to replace a bad match CEO with a new CEO, for the pro￿t of the ￿rm is dependent on the talent
of the CEO.
3In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), monitoring levels are de￿ned through board composition, which is
determined by the board and the incumbent CEO. Speci￿cally, they Nash bargain over a new board member,
whose monitoring cost is determined by how independent s/he is from the incumbent CEO.
3from the specialist(s) they hire. (All directors receive this information equally, and hence it is
assumed that there is symmetrical information among directors.) Thus, when the incumbent
board and CEO determine the amount they pay to the specialist(s), it can be regarded that
they are determining the monitoring level. The succession policy and the monitoring level
need not necessarily be determined at the same time, but for simplicity, these three topics are
determined together. That is, I show in the Appendix A.3 that the same result is obtained
(and by the same logic) when the board alone re-determines the succession policy after
the incumbent CEO￿ s tenure is terminated. Thus, it can be regarded that the board is not
making a commitment to the succession policy determined prior to forced CEO replacement.
The incumbent CEO is perceived to have acquired ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge which makes
the incumbent CEO more advantageous than potential CEOs in two aspects; that is, it gives
the incumbent CEO a bargaining power to negotiate his/her own wage4; and a rent.5 The
more heterogeneous the industry is, the more valuable the human capital of the CEO￿ s posi-
tion (Parrino (1997) ), and thus the higher the rent of the incumbent CEO. The bargaining
surplus includes the rent generated by the incumbent CEO￿ s ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge, but
it is not the rent itself. The more valuable the CEO￿ s human capital to the company, the
larger the rent generated by the human capital, and as a result, the larger the bargaining
surplus.
When the two incumbent players bargain over these three topics, the decision-making is
done in a way to maximize only the joint expected payo⁄of the incumbent board and CEO,
which does not internalize the welfare of the potential newcomer to the current management
group (that is, the incumbent board and CEO). Unlike the topics which do not involve
changes in the members of management group, such as, the decisions regarding the amount
4The incumbent CEO can be involved in Nash bargaining and determines his/her wage, for s/he has been
working in the ￿rm for a while and the board has found him/her more talented than those in the market.
The wage of the CEO is determined in Nash bargaining by the board members and the CEO himself, as
in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), for some talents that make the CEO more capable than other CEOs are
speci￿c to the ￿rm, making them unable to be evaluated properly outside the ￿rm. When a new CEO is
hired, s/he will receive some wage, but s/he does not have the bargaining power to negotiate over it with
the board.
5Any potential CEO￿ s talent is assumed to be the same as those in the market and hence s/he does not
have any rent.
4or choice of the investment or the issuance of bonds or stock options, the decision that is
related to the ￿ring of the incumbent CEO, as well as the decision about CEO succession
policy for both voluntary and forced CEO appointments, implies a member change to the
management group. However, the incumbent decision-makers￿concern (the concern of the
incumbent board and CEO) is to maximize ￿ their￿own bargaining surplus. Thus, despite the
fact that there are three players that may be a⁄ected by Nash bargaining, the two incumbent
players who do the bargaining do not internalize the potential newcomer￿ s expected welfare
(which is considered as a leakage from the expected joint welfare of the incumbent board
and CEO), thus creating an ine¢ ciency.6
One theoretical contribution of this paper is in ￿nding a new cause for undesirable CEO
retention. That is, due to the non-internalization of the potential newcomer￿ s welfare, the
equilibrium monitoring level departs from the optimum monitoring level of the corporation,
thus too often resulting in CEO retention when CEO turnover is in fact more optimal for
the corporation. More speci￿cally, the monitoring level is determined at the level that
reduces the probability of having leakage. Another important contribution is in ￿nding that
the non-internalization of the potential newcomer￿ s welfare a⁄ects the choice regarding the
appointment of a new CEO. That is, the succession policy is chosen not only by comparing
the expected pro￿ts brought to the ￿rm by the potential CEO￿ s talent (s/he could be from
either inside or outside the board), but also by comparing the amount of leakages to the
welfare of the incumbent board and CEO who are determining a new CEO. Hence, the
equilibrium succession policy may depart from the optimum succession policy, the latter of
which is the optimum from the shareholders￿perspective.
This paper provides the following empirical implications. Parrino (1997) reports that
CEO replacement is more frequently observed in homogeneous industries than in heteroge-
neous industries, for it is easier for the board to ￿nd a candidate with similar human capital
required for the CEO￿ s position. Berry et al. (2006) also focus on CEO￿ s human capital and
￿nd that diversi￿ed ￿rms choose their CEOs from a more talented labor pool than focused
6See Coase (1960).
5￿rms because CEOs of such companies need to be competent. This paper may give a new
implication to the results of Parrino (1997) and Berry et al. (2006). That is, in heteroge-
neous industries, CEO candidates do not have the ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge one ￿rm needs,
and hence the ￿rm will incur a search cost if it decides to bring an outside candidate in for a
new CEO￿ s position. This means the leakage from the bargaining surplus may become larger
than the additional pro￿t an outside candidate can bring (generated from his/her talent) to
the ￿rm, and hence the ￿rm promotes inside directors to the new CEO￿ s position. Similarly,
in diversi￿ed ￿rms, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd appropriate managers. Thus, the incumbent board
trades-o⁄ the leakage from the bargaining surplus and the additional pro￿t brought to the
￿rm by a new CEO (who may be ￿ talented￿ ), and if it considers the former to be larger than
the latter, it promotes an insider to the CEO￿ s post.
Further, there are many studies on CEO succession policy, and results are mixed. Some
report that internal promotion is more frequently observed, while others ￿nd outside re-
cruiting more common under certain conditions. See Agrawal et al. (2006), Ocasio (1999),
Clutterbuck (1998), Borokhovich et al. (1996). The theory developed in this paper may
explain why boards sometimes hire from outside and why they sometimes promote from
inside, and hence bridges the gap in empirical results.
The insight this paper provides goes further into the relation of board composition and
￿rm-performance. Yermack (1996) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) ￿nd no relation between
￿rm performance and board composition. Whether the board has inside directors or outside
directors, as long as they all participate in decision-making, they all share the common
incentive: to minimize the leakage from the incumbents￿group utility. Thus, irrelevant to
the characteristics of the board, the incumbent board members have the incentive to pursue
their own utility maximization which often results in retaining the sub-standard CEO or
hiring less talented CEO. In such cases, the ￿rm performance stays low or unimproved,
since the pro￿t of the ￿rm is dependent on CEO￿ s talent. In short, corporate value or ￿rm
performance is irrelevant to the board composition, and thus, the theoretical ￿nding of this
paper may explain the results of Yermack (1996) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996).
6The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper
discusses relevant literature. Section three develops a theoretical model and discusses how
non-internalization of the potential newcomer to the corporate board a⁄ects CEO￿ s tenure
and decisions on CEO succession policy. Section four discusses an extension of the model
developed in section three. Section ￿ve concludes.
2 Literature Review
There are several works in the literature that theoretically discuss the cause of the board￿ s
inertia in CEO replacement.7 However, there has not been any literature that argues utility
loss for the group (non-internalization of the potential newcomer￿ s welfare) as a cause of
CEO retention.8
In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), the incumbent board (treated as a single player) and
CEO determine the wage of the incumbent CEO and a new director to be appointed to the
board through Nash bargaining. This new board with the new director can be regarded
as a di⁄erent board from the incumbent board. Then, after the Nash bargaining, this new
board monitors the incumbent CEO.9 Thus, the incumbent CEO is willing to compromise
his/her wage in exchange for appointing a new director who is likely to be loyal to him/her.
Their main ￿nding is that when the CEO is involved in appointing a new director, someone
who is less independent from the CEO is appointed and weakens board monitoring of the
CEO, resulting in CEO retention. They measure the cost of monitoring with notation k:
the board￿ s lack of independence, where it changes from k0 (exogenously given) to k1 (en-
dogenously determined) (k0 < k1), as the board members change. This k can be interpreted
7Refer to the surveys provided by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Gillan (2006), Adams et al. (2008) for
both theoretical and empirical studies. Also refer to Tirole (2006).
8Sato (2007) applies the concept developed in this paper to assess Japanese corporate governance in
which CEOs are basically internally promoted from the incumbent board members. Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Rosen (1986), and Chan (1996) develop models on internal promotion system, but from di⁄erent
angles to Sato (2007).
9The board updates the incumbent CEO￿ s talent by monitoring (e.g. reviewing his/her conduct). Then,
if it believes that the CEO has poor talent, the board will replace the CEO. Therefore, the purpose of the
monitoring is to ￿re a sub-standard CEO and to hire a new CEO who is expected to increase the corporate
pro￿t. (The pro￿t of the ￿rm is dependent on the talent of the CEO in their model and also in this paper.)
7as a measure of comradeship or allegiance to the CEO, and they argue that the higher is k
(or the stronger the comradeship or allegiance to the CEO is); the less the board monitors
the incumbent CEO. In short, the monitoring level and the board￿ s measure of lack of inde-
pendence have one-to-one correspondence, and it can be regarded that the incumbent board
and the incumbent CEO are the players that are determining the monitoring level. Thus,
the incumbent CEO stays in a company for more than s/he deserves according to his/her
talent.
Raheja (2005) develops an interesting model in which she examines both the board weak
monitoring and a new CEO appointment. She develops a model in which inside directors
and outside directors encounter asymmetric information about a project implemented by the
CEO. In her paper, the insiders are better informed about management than outsiders, as
argued by Fama and Jensen (1983). The insiders are successor CEO candidates themselves.
They have the expertise knowledge in management and know the quality of the project
proposed by the CEO, whereas the outsiders cannot tell the quality of the proposed project
unless insiders share their superior information with them. When the information is shared,
the outsiders decide to vote for or against the proposed project, but to vote against it requires
veri￿cation that their decision is correct, and hence, monitoring (verifying) is performed by
outsiders. It is assumed that monitoring is so costly that the outsiders do not monitor without
the insiders￿information. This implies that in order for boards to function as monitoring
devices, the board must be comprised of both inside and outside directors.
The study by Raheja (2005) may seem somewhat similar to this paper, for it considers
both the monitoring levels and the CEO succession policy. In her paper, when outsiders
verify the information, the next CEO is voted from one of the insiders who had revealed
the information. However, the CEO succession policy itself is not completely determined
endogenously; speci￿cally, the insiders have the choice of whether or not to reveal the in-
formation. From where to hire the successor, though, is given as a rule when it comes to
the stage of appointment. In my model, the CEO successor himself/herself is endogenously
determined in the game through maximizing the utilities of all incumbent members. Despite
8the di⁄erences in our approaches, Raheja (2005), Hermalin (2005), and this paper are thus
far the papers that have attempted to endogenously choose the successor CEO.
3 Model
3.1 Basic Structure
In this section, I show that removing the incumbent CEO and appointing a new CEO induce a
member change in the management group, and this induces a certain utility loss (or ￿ leakage￿ )
to the incumbent members￿group utility. This deprives them of the incentive to remove (or
monitor) the incumbent CEO to avoid such ￿ leakage￿ . I also show that the type of ￿ leakage￿
varies according to the succession policy (inside promotion or outside recruiting), and the
incumbents prefer the succession policy with the smaller amount of ￿ leakage￿ , holding other
things equal.
Players
There are two players, the incumbent board and CEO. I use the term ￿ board￿to refer to
n directors who act as one player.10 All n directors act as one player, the board, and hence
there is no free-rider problem. The passive player is the new CEO who is either promoted
from the incumbent board or recruited from outside the incumbent board.
Strategies
The incumbent board and CEO bargain over the choice of a new CEO, the incumbent
CEO￿ s wage w, and the amount d(p) they pay to the specialist(s) (such as internal auditors
hired from outside the ￿rm) who monitor(s) the CEO￿ s conduct and report(s) to the board.
Then, the board updates its prior distribution about the incumbent CEO￿ s talent with
probability p (CEO￿ s true talent is either high (H) or low (L)) : the board discovers the
incumbent CEO￿ s talent to be H with probability q; the board discovers the incumbent
CEO￿ s talent to be L with probability (1 ￿ q). The incumbent CEO is replaced by the new
CEO when s/he is believed to be type L by the board of directors with probability p(1￿q);
otherwise, the incumbent CEO stays till the end of the game. The CEO￿ s true talent (high
10See Wilson [1968] for treating players of the same utility function as one group.
9(H) or low (L)) is not known to any player till monitoring, but the incumbent CEO is
perceived to have higher talent as compared to any other potential CEOs at the beginning
of the stage.
Payo⁄s
The incumbent CEO receives endogenously determined wage w, and non-contractable
private bene￿t b (i.e. reputation which will give him/her more bargaining power in the
future) if s/he is retained to the last stage. The new CEO receives the starting wage (w b N if
recruited from outside the board, wN if promoted from inside the board). The board receives
a ratio ￿ from the corporate pro￿t less monitoring cost less payment to the incumbent CEO
and the new CEO.
Expected corporate pro￿t is dependent on the distribution of the CEO￿ s talent. I assume
that the board obtains ￿ from the corporate pro￿t. That is, the expected pro￿t of the ￿rm
is denoted by Xi, where i denotes CEO￿ s true talent, which is either high (H) or low (L).
Then the board obtains ￿ = ￿
￿
￿XH + (1 ￿ ￿)XL
￿
, where ￿ is the probability of the CEO￿ s
talent being high, and it is determined through the Bayes￿update as described in the section
3.2. If the incumbent CEO serves to the end without his/her prior talent being updated
by monitoring (that is, ￿ remains unchanged), the board is expected to receive ￿I; if the
incumbent CEO is monitored and perceived to have high talent, ￿ is updated and the board is
expected to receive ￿H; if the incumbent CEO is monitored and perceived to have low talent,
￿ is updated and the board will receive ￿L but this is not realized in the equilibrium, for
such a CEO would be replaced by the new CEO. If the new CEO is hired after the dismissal
of the incumbent CEO, and is recruited from outside, the board is expected to receive ￿ b N,
whereas it is expected to receive ￿N when promoted from inside the incumbent board. The
relations among expected pro￿ts to the board are induced by the Bayes￿update as described
in the Appendix A.4, and they are ￿H > ￿I > ￿L; ￿H > ￿ b N > ￿L; ￿H > ￿N > ￿L; ￿I > ￿ b N;
and ￿I > ￿N. The di⁄erence between ￿ b N and ￿N comes from whether the new CEO is hired
from outside the incumbent board, or whether s/he is promoted from inside the board. I do
not specify the relation between ￿ b N and ￿N , since there are both merits and demerits for
10both types of potential CEOs.11
3.2 Timing
There are four stages. The basic structure of the interaction between the board and the
incumbent CEO is followed from Hermalin and Weisbach (1998).12
First stage: The ￿rm has one incumbent CEO and the board. All the incumbent
members Nash bargain over the contract regarding the wage of the incumbent CEO denoted
w, the amount d(p) which they pay to the specialist(s) who monitor(s) the CEO (where, p is
the intensity of monitoring by the specialist(s) and this equals the probability that the board
obtains precise information about the CEO￿ s talent), and the succession policy of whether
to hire a new CEO from outside the incumbent board or to promote one of the incumbent
directors. The prior distribution about incumbent CEO￿ s talent being H is assumed to be
more than 1
2, where any other potential CEOs￿prior distribution about their talents are
assumed to be precisely 1
2 for being H.13
Second stage: The specialist(s) monitor(s) CEO￿ s conduct and give(s) the information to
the board of directors. Based on the information, the board updates the prior distribution of
the incumbent CEO￿ s talent. With probability p, the board receives a precise information to
update its prior distribution about the talent of the incumbent CEO. That is, with probability
p; it receives the information of fyG;yBg: De￿ne q = Pr(yGjI); and 1 ￿ q = Pr(yBjI) where
11For example, outside CEO candidates may be management experts in the same industry and may be
talented. However, they may not ￿t the culture of the company. On the other hand, insider CEO candidates
may be very knowledgeable about their company, but at the same time, may not be able to make the
necessary changes in management. Bower (2007) argues that the insider with the outsider￿ s perspective
(which s/he refers to as inside outsiders) would be the best successor. Since it is beyond the scope of this
paper to argue about inside outsiders, I assume the priors about the abilities of both candidates to be the
same, even though the outcome may be di⁄erent. The detail is in the Appendix A.4.
12In their model, CEO replacement can induce ￿ leakage.￿ However, they do not discuss the e⁄ect of it
on board decision makings. Hence, I would like to provide a model of how ￿ leakage￿a⁄ects the decisions
determined by the board by extending their model. Also, another new feature of this paper is to incorporate
the process in which the board determines where to hire the next CEO from, which was given exogenous to
the model proposed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998).
13In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), the initial CEO￿ s talent is updated before the negotiation in order to
give the CEO some bargaining power. However, this process can be shortened by assuming the prior about
his/her talent to be higher than any new potential CEOs. See Appendix A.4. about the priors and the
posteriors.
11I denotes the event of the board receiving information. When the board receives yG or yB;
the prior distribution about the CEO￿ s talent is updated; the board regards the incumbent
CEO to be type H with probability 1 when it receives yG, and type L with probability 1
when it receives yB. With probability (1 ￿ p), it receives non informative information yI;
and the prior distribution about the incumbent CEO￿ s talent stays the same.
Third stage: The board retains or replaces the incumbent CEO based on the information.
That is, it retains the incumbent CEO when the board receives yG or yI; it ￿res the incumbent
CEO when it receives yB, and hires a new CEO from outside or inside the board based on the
decision made in the ￿rst stage. (All the remaining directors may renegotiate the succession
policy after the incumbent CEO has been ￿red, but even if they renegotiate the succession
policy, the same conclusion as determined in the ￿rst stage is derived.14 The proof is in
Appendix A.3.)
Fourth stage: Production is made and all the players receive their pays.
3.3 The Players￿Objectives
The number of directors (n) on the board, the non-contractable private bene￿t b the CEO
who is serving at the last stage of the game receives, and the wages to the newly hired CEO
(wb N if recruited from outside, and wN if recruited from inside the incumbent board), are
exogenously given.15
The incumbent CEO￿ s expected utility is expressed as
[pq + (1 ￿ p)]b + w; (1)
for s/he receives the wage w determined in the negotiation, but the non-contractable private
14Even if the remaining directors renegotiate the succession policy after they dismiss the initial CEO in
stage three, they still choose the same policy as determined in the ￿rst stage. Therefore, it may seem as if
the directors commit to the succession policy determined in the ￿rst stage, but it is not a commitment. The
succession policy is determined in the ￿rst stage to simplify the analysis.
15From the perspective of the game theory, the wage wN that will be paid to the internally promoted CEO
could be endogenously determined. If the model was built this way, the incumbent directors would increase
the amount of wage wN as much as possible (This is because n￿1
n ￿N + b + 1
nwN can be derived from the
expression (3) presented later in this subsection ). However, the shareholders will not allow such extremely
high wage determined by the inside directors, and hence it woulde be unrealistic.
12bene￿t b is only given when s/he is retained to the end of the game. S/he is retained when
the board receives yG (occurs with probability pq) or yI (occurs with probability (1 ￿ p)).16
In other words, if the incumbent CEO is dismissed prior to the last stage, s/he will not
obtain b, but instead, the newly hired CEO will obtain it.
The expected utility of the board (this is for the total of n incumbent directors) di⁄ers
by where they choose the new CEO from.





+ np(1 ￿ q)
￿b N ￿ wb N
n
+ n(1 ￿ p)
￿I
n
￿ d(p) ￿ w: (2)




n + (1 ￿ q)
￿c N ￿wb N
n
i
; is the expected utility to the
board when it receives a precise information about the incumbent CEO; speci￿cally, n is the
number of directors serving on the board and p is the probability that the directors obtain
precise information about the incumbent CEO. With probability pq; the board receives yG,
and each director on the board will receive
￿H
n : With probability p(1￿q), the board receives
yB, and hence the board replaces the incumbent CEO. Then, each director on the board will
receive
￿c N ￿wc N
n each. The wage wb N is paid to the new CEO who will be hired from outside
the incumbent board. The new CEO does not have any bargaining power, and hence the
amount of this wage is assumed to be determined in the market. The new CEO, if hired
with probability p(1 ￿ q), will also obtain the non-contractable private bene￿t b, but this is
not internalized in either the board utility or the incumbent CEO￿ s utility. The third term,
n(1 ￿ p)
￿I
n ; is the utility of the board when the incumbent CEO is retained as a result of
the board receiving yI. The fourth term d(p); where p 2 [0;1); is the cost of monitoring,
which is a strictly increasing, strictly convex, twice continuously di⁄erentiable function. I
assume d0(0) = 0; and d0(p) ! 1 as p ! 1; which derives interior solutions. The ￿fth term,
w; is the amount of wage paid to the incumbent CEO:
On the other hand, the expected utility of the board is expressed as the following if the
16The substantial result in this paper will not be a⁄ected if the amount of b is di⁄erent for the CEO who
was monitored and retained and who was retained without monitoring.









+ b + wN
￿
+ n(1 ￿ p)
￿I
n
￿ d(p) ￿ w: (3)
I assume each inside director has an equal chance of being promoted to the new CEO.




n + b + wN
i









; that is when the board obtains the precise information with
probability p, and it updated the incumbent CEO￿ s talent distribution to be low with prob-
ability (1 ￿ q), one of the inside directors is promoted to a new CEO and the remaining
directors stay on the board. That is, wN will be paid to the new CEO who was originally
the member of the board, so the remaining n ￿ 1 directors each receive
(￿N ￿wN)
n . From
the perspective of the newly promoted CEO, s/he will receive the wage wN and the private





n will be paid to the newly hired director to re￿ll the vacancy in the
board.17 This new director￿ s expected utility is not internalized in either the expected utility
of the current board or the expected utility of the incumbent CEO. Note that the expected
payment of wN +b to the new CEO (a former inside director) is internalized, for s/he is the
original incumbent member. The other terms are as (2).
3.4 Analysis on Board Decision-making: Succession Policy and
CEO Retention
In this subsection, I show that both incumbent players in this model have the incentives to
maximize their joint expected utility when making decisions. This is because the players￿
utilities are transferable, and they Nash bargain.18 Thus, maximizing the joint expected util-
ity expands the feasible set. However, there are ine¢ ciencies when they are not internalizing
17Note that there are two possible cases for the newcomers. When the board recruits the CEO from
outside, the newcomer is the new CEO. When the board promotes one of the incumbent directors to the
board, the newcomer is then the new director who is hired to re￿ll the board. In the long term, the board
size may decrease, but in the short term, the board needs to keep a certain number of directors to keep its
job operating. Moreover, re￿lling the board has an aspect of giving incentives to the workers to work hard
in order to get internally promoted to be the director in the future.
18The wage w is subtracted from the incumbent board￿ s expected utility. It is added to the incumbent
CEO￿ s expected utility as w. See the Appendix A.1 and A.2 for details.
14the expected utilities of potential newcomers who might join the board in the future.
3.4.1 The Choice of a Successor CEO and Monitoring Levels
In what follows, I discuss how monitoring levels and succession policies are determined when
the incumbent board members are not internalizing the potential newcomer￿ s welfare.
Nash product is either
VO ￿ fp[q￿H + (1 ￿ q)(￿b N ￿ wb N)] + (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p) ￿ w ￿ ￿Bg (4)









+ b + wN
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p) ￿ w ￿ ￿B
￿
(5)
￿f[pq + (1 ￿ p)]b + w ￿ ￿Cg;
The di⁄erence of (4) and (5) comes from where the new CEO will be hired: Nash product
(4) is when the new CEO is going to be hired from outside the board, while (5) is when the
new CEO is going to be internally promoted. The threat points are expressed as (￿B;￿C)
for (4) and (5). That is, if the negotiation breaks down, the board will receive ￿B; and the
incumbent CEO will receive ￿C:
Given the succession policy, the players determine the optimum monitoring level p￿ that
expands the frontier as outwards as possible. Note that Nash bargaining frontier is linear
in forty-￿ve degrees. (See the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix A.1 and A.2 and
Figure One.) Hence, when comparing the two succession policies, the board determines to
adopt a succession policy with higher frontier.19 (See Figure One.) To be more speci￿c, the
monitoring level is determined at the level that shifts the bargaining frontier as outward as
possible, where the ceiling of the frontier di⁄ers according to the succession policy. Thus, the
policy that will expand the frontier further outwards than the other policy will be chosen.20
19Free disposal is assumed. Since the frontier is linear, the feasible set of Nash bargaining is convex.
20Since one or the other feasible set always encompasses the other, the feasible set with the larger capacity
(higher ceiling) always makes the players better o⁄.
15However, one policy is not always better than the other policy (for example, outside recruiting
is not always better than inside recruiting, and vice versa). Whether or not one policy is
more desirable than the other depends on the expected pro￿ts brought to the ￿rm by the new
CEO and the amount of ￿ leakage￿that occurs￿ an amount that varies according to di⁄erent
situations. As shown in the Appendix A.1 and A.2, and Figure One, the frontier can be
expressed as the sum of the board expected utility and the incumbent CEO￿ s expected
utility.
The joint expected utility of the incumbent members when the new CEO is to be hired
from outside the incumbent board is expressed as
pq￿H + p(1 ￿ q)(￿b N ￿ wb N) + (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p) + [pq + (1 ￿ p)]b; (6)
which is the addition of (1) and (2). The joint expected utility of the incumbent members
when one of the inside directors is promoted to be the new CEO is expressed as





+ b + wN
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p) + [pq + (1 ￿ p)]b; (7)
which is the addition of (1) and (3).
In comparing the above two expressions, (6) > (7) holds for all p, when
￿b N ￿ wb N ￿
￿
￿N ￿ wN ￿
1
n
(￿N ￿ wN) + (b + wN)
￿
> 0;
and (6) < (7) holds for all p, when
￿b N ￿ wb N ￿
￿
￿N ￿ wN ￿
1
n
(￿N ￿ wN) + (b + wN)
￿
< 0:
In other words, the su¢ cient condition to hire a CEO from outside the board is:
￿b N + b ￿ (wb N + b) > ￿N + b ￿
1
n
(￿N ￿ wN) (8)
and the su¢ cient condition to promote inside directors to be CEO is expressed as:
￿b N + b ￿ (wb N + b) < ￿N + b ￿
1
n
(￿N ￿ wN): (9)
16The possible gross expected payo⁄ to the incumbent players is ￿b N + b; if the new CEO is
recruited from outside the incumbent board, and it is ￿N + b, if the new CEO is recruited
from inside the incumbent board. The ￿ leakage￿to the newcomer is expressed as wb N + b for
the former, while it is 1
n (￿N ￿ wN) for the latter. Recall that the newly inside promoted
CEO is the original incumbent board member, so any expected payment s/he will receive is
not considered as a ￿ leakage￿ .
Given the above argument, the incumbents￿decision to promote inside director or recruit
from outside is determined by comparing the amount of di⁄erence between the leakages and
the amount of di⁄erence between the expected pro￿ts brought to the ￿rm by the potential
CEOs. That is, even if the expected pro￿t brought to the board by the new outside CEO
is higher than that brought by the new inside CEO (￿b N > ￿N), if a wage to the outside
new CEO and a non-contractable private bene￿t are too high, the board has an incentive to
promote the inside director. This trade-o⁄ leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The incumbents decide to recruit from outside the incumbent board when (8)
holds, and to promote one of the inside directors as a successor CEO when (9) holds.
Proposition 1 implies that if the wage w b N to the new CEO who is recruited from outside
the board and/or the non-contractable private bene￿t b the CEO who is serving at the end
of the stage can receive are considered to be large, the incumbent decision-makers have the
incentive to promote the inside director to the new CEO, unless this outside recruited CEO is
expected to bring big enough pro￿t to compensate the loss of w b N and b from the bargaining
surplus.
An interesting case is when the board promotes one of the inside directors to the post
even when there is a potential CEO outside the board who is expected to bring a higher net
pro￿t to the ￿rm. (￿ b N > ￿N with not too big di⁄erence). This may happen in companies
that are or started out as family businesses.21
21Charkham [2005] points out that a manager￿ s attitude (and thus hiring tendencies) may not change even
after companies that started as family businesses have grown to publicly quoted companies.
17For example, consider a case in which all the inside directors are nepotism, and the
entrepreneur or the CEO could be the only one who is talented in management. In such
a case, when the incumbent CEO retires, hiring a new CEO from outside the current ￿rm
might be better than appointing a less-than-adequate insider as the new CEO. However, as
is often observed in practice, the CEO￿ s o⁄spring may succeed in the post.
Corollary 1 The board may promote an insider to the post of CEO even when there
exist outside potential CEOs who are expected to be more talented than any of the inside
potential CEOs.
The above Corollary holds unless ￿b N is much higher than ￿N; so as to alter the inequality
of (9):
Next, I show the monitoring levels determined unique to the succession policy.
Proposition 2 The monitoring levels are determined unique to the succession policy and
they are expressed as follows.
1. If the board determines to promote one of the inside incumbent directors, it is:
d
0(p) = q￿H + (1 ￿ q)￿N ￿ ￿I ￿ (1 ￿ q)
1
n
(￿N ￿ wN): (10)
2. If the board determines to recruit from outside the incumbent board members, it is:
d
0(p) = q￿H + (1 ￿ q)￿b N ￿ ￿I ￿ (1 ￿ q)(b + w b N): (11)
This proposition suggests that due to the non-internalization of the potential newcomer￿ s
welfare, the equilibrium monitoring level are attenuated by the amount of ￿ leakages,￿thus
too often resulting in CEO retention when CEO turnover is in fact more optimal for the
corporation. Since monitoring levels are the proxies for CEO retentions in this model, CEO￿ s
retention policy is determined at the level that reduces the probability of having ￿ leakage￿ .
These monitoring levels are determined as follows. The monitoring levels are determined
at the level that shifts the bargaining frontier as outward as possible, given the succession
policy. The ￿ leakage￿that the incumbent board incurs by having CEO replacement is re￿ ected
18in the last term of both (10) and (11). That is, with probability (1￿q), the incumbent CEO
is ￿red, and a newcomer is hired and
￿N ￿wN
n or (b + w b N) will be the ￿ leakages￿from the
bargaining surplus. Recall that when one of the inside directors is promoted to be the new
CEO, the board hires a new director to maintain the number of directors at n: Thus the
payment of
￿N ￿wN
n is given to this new director, and this is considered as a ￿ leakage￿from
the perspective of the incumbent board members, whereas if the board brings a new CEO
from outside the incumbent board, the new CEO is the newcomer and the wage w b N and
the bene￿t b s/he receives in place of the incumbent CEO is the ￿ leakage￿ . As for (10), the
higher the wage wN to the new CEO, the more the board monitors. This is because the
inside directors have the incentive to become the new CEO themselves. However, usually
￿N ￿wN > 0 holds, and thus, monitoring levels are attenuated for both (10) and (11) by the
￿ leakages.￿
Corollary 2 Regardless of the board composition, the board has an incentive to retain
the incumbent CEO who is less talented than potential CEOs. Thus board composition does
not a⁄ect ￿rm performance.
I have shown that the expected utility to the board di⁄ers depending on the succession
policy it chooses. The expected utility of the board under the outside recruiting policy is
(2). This can be considered as the expected utility of the board composed solely of outside
directors.22 (See Borokhovich et al [1996] for a positive relation between the percentage
of outside directors and the frequency of outside CEO succession.) On the other hand,
the expected utility of the board under the internal promotion policy (which is (3)) can be
interpreted as the expected utility of the board which is solely composed of inside directors.23
22Note that when the board decides to recruit the new CEO from outside the board, none of the incumbent
directors become CEO candidates. One way to interpret this type of board is to consider it as a board
composed solely of outside directors. An outside director usually has his/her primary job elsewhere, such as
a professor, and hence s/he has no incentive to become the successor CEO of the company in which s/he is
serving as an outside director.
23When the board decides to recruit the new CEO from within, all the incumbent directors become the
potential CEOs. Thus the board with the internal promotion policy can be considered to have the same
expected utility as the board composed solely of inside directors.
19Therefore, regardless of the board composition, the board has an incentive to retain the
incumbent CEO. I also note that even if the board had both insiders and outsiders (de￿ned
from their incentives to become the successor CEO) at the same time, the substantial result
is the same.24
4 Extension: Internalization of the Newcomer￿ s Wel-
fare
4.1 Social Surplus Maximization
Below I show that when the incumbent board members do internalize the newcomer￿ s welfare
(that is, they ￿ must￿internalize the newcomer￿ s welfare), the monitoring level is higher than
the equilibrium monitoring levels determined by the incumbent board and CEO, and the
succession policy equals the optimum succession policy for the shareholders.
The optimum succession policy is to hire a potential CEO who is expected to bring a
higher net expected pro￿t to the board:
maxf￿b N ￿ wb N, ￿N ￿ wNg: (12)
This is the optimum for all three players (the incumbent CEO, the board, and the potential
newcomers). If, w b N = wN (12) is expressed as:
max
￿




This equals the optimum from the shareholders￿perspective as well.
Because the players utilities are transferable, and they all Nash bargain, the optimum
monitoring level is determined to maximize the joint expected utility of all players, including
the incumbent members and those newcomers (a new CEO if recruited from outside and a
new director if promoted from inside the board) who may be appointed to the board after
24The proof is provided in Sato (2008).
20the CEO replacement. The joint expected utility of such case is expressed as:





+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p) + b: (14)
This expression holds when wN is not necessarily equal to w b N. See the Appendix A.5 for
the proof. Taking the ￿rst-order condition with respect to p induces the optimum level of
monitoring:
d






Equation (15) shows that when the incumbent board members internalize the expected utility
of future newcomers to the board, the board monitoring level is not attenuated by ￿ leakage,￿
which is either wb N+ b or
￿N ￿wN
n :
4.2 Re-employment of the Retired CEO
Theoretically, the social surplus maximization described in section 4.1 is attained if there is
no newcomer to the incumbent management group. If there is no newcomer on the board,
the monitoring level becomes more intense and the probability of removing an ine¢ cient
CEO increases. One way to achieve this is to re-employ the retired CEO to the director￿ s
post under an internal promotion system when ￿b N + ￿N holds. That is, under an internal
promotion system, if the incumbent CEO departs, one of the directors becomes the CEO,
and then to maintain the board size at n, a new director is hired as in Japanese companies.
The idea is to re-employ the departed CEO (who was participating in the negotiation) to
the director instead of hiring a new director or promoting a successful worker to the director.
This leads to:
Proposition 3 The monitoring level with no newcomer to the corporate board is expressed
as:
d
0(p) = [q￿H ￿ ￿I + (1 ￿ q)￿N]: (16)
Note that (16) equals the optimum level of monitoring (15), when ￿N > ￿b N holds, and
hence the monitoring level is always larger than (10). Even though the incumbent CEO
might not have been a good match as a manager who leads the company, given his/her
21knowledge and experience of the company, s/he may still remain on the board as one of the
directors that participate in principle decision makings or monitoring.
However, this may not be the plan of action, for this is not realistic in business practice.
Even if this were possible in practice, re-employing the retired CEO may happen for once,
but this is not realistic for all n members on the board who have promoted to the new CEO￿ s
post. Therefore, in the real world practice, what has been discussed in section three holds.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores an explanation for the cause of ine¢ cient CEO retentions and CEO
appointments. All the incumbent members jointly determine the succession policy, the
incumbent CEO￿ s wage, and the monitoring level. When they jointly determine these issues,
they do not internalize the welfare of the potential newcomer. Thus, the incumbents are
maximizing their joint expected utility, but what they are maximizing has a utility leakage
from the whole group. I show that the equilibrium monitoring level departs from the optimum
monitoring level of the corporation, thus too often resulting in ine¢ cient CEO retention. I
also show that the equilibrium succession policy may depart from the optimum succession
policy, the latter of which is the optimum from the shareholders￿perspective.
In this model, the incumbent board and CEO do not negotiate with the potential CEOs
only to simplify the exposition. That is, even if the model allows the board and CEO
to have a choice of negotiating or not negotiating with potential CEOs, they may choose
not to negotiate if they consider ￿ leakage￿to be large. This would make the management
group￿ s decision to depart from shareholders￿expectation. However, if there is a system
in which someone, such as a block-shareholder, can negotiate in place of the newcomer,
such ine¢ ciency can be avoided. A contingent governance system as suggested by Aoki
(1988), may be one solution. That is, if a block shareholder (e.g. main-banks in Japan)
can participate in negotiation in ￿nancial distress situation (they are not the ￿ incumbent
members￿in ordinary situations), then this may allow the negotiation to re￿ ect the interest
of the shareholders.
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Appendices
Appendix A.1. The Proof of Proposition 2(1): (10)
VI ￿
￿





+ b + wN
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p) ￿ w ￿ ￿B
￿
￿f[pq + (1 ￿ p)]b + w ￿ ￿Cg
I denote ￿B and ￿C as the threat points of each players, where (￿B;￿C) is assumed to be an
interior point of the feasible set. In this model, whatever the amount of the threat point
which is in the interior of the feasible set, it does not a⁄ect the decisions regarding the
succession policy and the monitoring levels. Denote the ￿rst bracket as A and the second as






A = 0: (17)
Next, derive the ￿rst-order condition maximizing VI with respect to w The ￿rst-order con-
dition with respect to w yields
￿B + A = 0 (18)
Thus, from (17) and (18), @A
@p + @B
@p = 0 is obtained. Hence, this is the maximization (w.r.t.
p) of the joint expected utility. Then, organize this to obtain d0(p); which is expressed as:
d




25which is the level of monitoring as shown in (10). Thus, the frontier is expressed as 45-degree
line, for w is transferable.











+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p)










q￿H + (1 ￿ q)(￿b N ￿ w b N)
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p) ￿ w ￿ ￿B
￿
￿f[pq + (1 ￿ p)]b + w ￿ ￿Cg
I denote ￿B and ￿C as the threat points of each players, where (￿B;￿C) is assumed to
be an interior point of the feasible set. Denote the ￿rst bracket as A and the second as B.






A = 0: (19)
Next, derive the ￿rst-order condition maximizing VO with respect to w: The ￿rst-order con-
dition with respect to w yields
￿B + A = 0 (20)
Thus, (19) and (20) yield @A
@p + @B
@p = 0: Hence, this is the maximization (w.r.t. p) of the
joint expected utility. Organize this and d0(p) is obtained as:
d
0(p) = q￿H + (1 ￿ q)￿b N ￿ ￿I ￿ (1 ￿ q)(b + w b N);
which is the level of monitoring as shown in (11). Thus, the frontier is expressed as 45-degree
line, for w is transferable.







pq￿H + p(1 ￿ q)(￿b N ￿ wb N) ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p)





Appendix A.3. The Proof of Re-negotiation about the Succession Policy
Below I show that even if the existing board re-determines the succession policy after the
incumbent CEO￿ s tenure has been terminated, it still adopts the same succession policy as
what have been determined together with the incumbent CEO in the ￿rst stage.
If the board were to redetermine the succession policy, it will take place between the third
and the fourth stage. At this stage, the wage to the incumbent CEO and d(p) are already
determined and they cannot change the contract even after the CEO has been dismissed.
Therefore, the board￿ s expected utility will be expressed as
￿ b N ￿ w b N; (21)
if they decide to hire from outside. On the other hand, if the board decides to recruit one of




+ (b + wN): (22)
The comparison of (21) and (22) yields to the same result as Proposition 1.
q.e.d.
Appendix A.4. Deriving ￿H > ￿I > ￿L; ￿H > ￿ b N > ￿L, ￿I > ￿ b N; ￿I > ￿N and
￿H > ￿N > ￿L by the Bayes￿Rule
A CEO￿ s talent is given exogenous as ai; i 2 fH;Lg;where aH stands for high talent
and aL stands for low talent. No player knows CEO￿ s true talent. The prior distribution of
27the talent of the incumbent CEO is given exogenous as ￿i; i 2 fH;Lg; where ￿H > ￿L;and
￿H + ￿L = 1: ￿H represents the incumbent CEO is of type aH; and ￿L represents that the
incumbent CEO is of type aL: On the other hand, the prior distribution of the talent of any
new potential CEO (regardless of whether s/he is a director on the board or an outsider) is
assumed to be 1
2 for both being aH and aL: The pro￿t of the ￿rm is denoted Xj, j 2 fH;Lg;
where XH > XL > 0: Then the conditional probability of outcome dependent on the talent
of the CEO is expressed as P i
j ￿ PrfXjjaig. For example, P H
L is the probability that the









I assume P H
H > P L
H; and hence, P L
L > P H
L holds. Given these assumptions, the expected
￿rm pro￿t conditional on CEO￿ s talent is expressed as X
H
￿ P H
H XH + P H
L XL when the
CEO is of type aH. It is expressed as X
L
￿ P L
HXH + P L
LXL when the CEO is of type aL.




. That is, the expected board pro￿t can




: Thus, the expected board pro￿t when the incumbent CEO












































I denote as ￿ b N , the expected board pro￿t when a new CEO is appointed from outside the
board:






















where the outcome b XH is di⁄erent from XH; and b XL is di⁄erent from XL. A new CEO has
28the prior probability of aH = 1
2; whether recruited from inside the board or from outside
the board, but outcomes are di⁄erent. That is why the expected outcomes depending on
distribution of CEO￿ s talent are di⁄erent.
Given the information structure that the specialist(s) provide(s) to the board of directors,
the expected pro￿t of the board when it receives the information from the specialist(s) is as
follows.
The board obtains a precise information y 2 fyG;yBg with probability p: With probability
(1￿p), the board receives non-informative information yI about the incumbent CEO￿ s talent.
When the board receives yG; it regards the CEO to be type H with probability 1. Likewise,
if the board receives yB; it regards the CEO to be type L with probability 1. Given these




















Therefore, ￿H > ￿I > ￿L, ￿H > ￿N > ￿L, ￿I > ￿ b N; and ￿I > ￿N are derived. I assume
￿H > ￿b N > ￿L holds:
q.e.d.
Appendix A.5. The Proof for the Social Surplus Maximization in Section 4.1.
I start with the expected utility of the whole group under outside recruiting policy.
The expected utility for the board (n directors) is
pq￿H + p(1 ￿ q)
￿
￿ b N ￿ w b N
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ w ￿ d(p): (23)
The expected utility for the incumbent CEO is
pqb + (1 ￿ p)b + w: (24)
29The expected utility for the potential CEO (who is the newcomer to the group under outside
recruiting policy) is
p(1 ￿ q)(b + w b N): (25)
Thus, the sum of all three players (the sum is derived as a result of Nash bargaining) is
expressed as
pq￿H + p(1 ￿ q)￿ b N + (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p); (26)
and the equilibrium monitoring level is derived as:
d
0(p) = q￿H + (1 ￿ q)￿ b N ￿ ￿I: (27)
Next, I show the expected utility of the whole group under inside promotion policy.
The expected utility for the board (n directors) is




(￿N ￿ wN) + b + wN
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ w ￿ d(p); (28)
where the potential new CEO￿ s expected utility is internalized in the above expected utility
as p(1 ￿ q)(b + wN): This is because one of the incumbent directors becomes the new CEO
if the incumbent CEO is dismissed. The expected utility of the incumbent CEO is the same
as that of the outside recruiting policy, and it is (24).
The expected utility of the new director who will be hired after the CEO replacement





(￿N ￿ wN): (29)
Thus, the sum of all three players (the sum is derived as a result of Nash bargaining) is
expressed as
pq￿H + p(1 ￿ q)￿N + (1 ￿ p)￿I ￿ d(p); (30)
and the equilibrium monitoring level is derived as:
d
0(p) = q￿H + (1 ￿ q)￿N ￿ ￿I: (31)
30From (27) and (31), the optimum monitoring level for the group is expressed as
d
0(p) = q￿H + (1 ￿ q)Max
￿
￿ b N; ￿N
￿
￿ ￿I: (32)
Hence (32) is the same as (15).
q.e.d.
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